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New Methods of Financial White-Collar 
Criminal Investigation and Prosecution: 
The Spillover of Wiretaps to Civil 
Enforcement Proceedings 
 
Andrew P. Atkins
*
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
A new era of white-collar criminal enforcement has emerged from 
the 2008 to 2010 financial crisis.
1
 Nowhere is this more evident than in 
the field of financial crimes.
2
 In what has been described as “a tactical 
sea change in its pursuit of financial malefactors,”3 new prosecutors and 
regulators are jumping into the sphere of financial crime enforcement,
4
 
and the federal government, primarily through the Department of Justice 
 
  * Andrew P. Atkins is an attorney at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”). Before joining the OCC, he clerked for Justice Mark D. Martin of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina. The author would like to thank Jennifer Peterson for her 
comments and edits. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author 
and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the OCC. Any errors or omissions are 
solely those of the author. 
1. Mei Lin Kwan-Gett, Developing Effective Strategies in White Collar Cases, in 
MANAGING WHITE COLLAR LEGAL ISSUES: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING 
RECENT NOTABLE CASES, ESTABLISHING KEY DEFENSE STRATEGIES, AND DEVELOPING 
CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS (INSIDE THE MINDS) 91, 92 (Aspatore Books 2010) (stating there 
is “increased emphasis on white collar crime” and discussing increased attention by 
prosecutors and regulators); Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, Overview of Federal 
Wiretap Law in White-Collar Cases, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202479830264&Overview_
of_Federal_Wiretap_Law_in_WhiteCollar_Cases&slreturn=20130127181642 
(discussing new investigative techniques used by the federal government to investigate 
financial crimes); Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, NY TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/index.html 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2012) (discussing the financial crisis and its timeline). 
2. See Morvillo & Anello, supra note 1. 
3. Abigail Field, Sorry, Judge Rakoff: You Can’t Give the SEC the Galleon 
Wiretaps . . . Yet, DAILYFINANCE (Sept. 30, 2010, 3:30 PM), 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/investing/galleon-wiretaps-insider-trading-rakoff-
overturned-sec-justice-trial/19655156/. 
4. Kwan-Gett, supra note 1, at 92. These new prosecutors include state and local 
prosecutors, especially within the state of New York. Id. 
1
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(“DOJ”), is using new investigative techniques.5 Most notable among 
these new investigative techniques is the use of court-authorized 
wiretaps.
6
 Traditionally used to prosecute organized crime, gangs, 
terrorists,
7
 and drug cartels,
8
 prosecutors are now aggressively using 
wiretaps to target insider trading.
9
 The federal government is now truly 
going after the “Wall Street mob.”10 
While the use of wiretaps by the federal government to target 
insider trading rings is certainly interesting in its own right, perhaps the 
more interesting issue is how the use of wiretaps to investigate and 
prosecute financial crimes will affect parallel civil enforcement 
proceedings.
11
 This Article will analyze if and how the contents of court-
authorized wiretaps obtained for use in criminal proceedings may also be 
used by regulatory agencies in their civil enforcement proceedings. 
Presumably, any regulatory agency targeting civil enforcement of an 
offense with a parallel, or near parallel, criminal offense could take 
advantage of court-authorized wiretaps.
12
 However, for simplicity, this 
Article will focus on the use of wiretaps by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) in its civil enforcement proceedings. In so doing, 
this Article will use the civil and criminal insider trading charges against 
Raj Rajaratnam, Galleon Management, and Danielle Chiesi as an 
illustrative example.
13
 Although some of the issues presented by these 
 
5. Morvillo & Anello, supra note 1. 
6. Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Prepared Remarks for U.S. 
Attorney Preet Bharara: U.S. v. Raj Rajaratnam, et al.; U.S. v. Dainielle [sic] Chiesi, et 
al. Hedge Fund Insider Trading Takedown (Oct. 16, 2009). 
7. Gail Shifman, Wall Street Meets “The Wire,” WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG 
(Oct. 19, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2009/10/wall-
street-meets-the-wire.html. 
8. Bharara, supra note 6. 
9. Id. 
10. See The Truth Shall Set Ye Free, Wall Street Mob Set to Pay Themselves $144 
Billion, DAILY KOS (Oct. 15, 2010, 9:12 AM), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/10/15/900441/-Wall-Street-mob-set-to-pay-
themselves-144-BILLION (representing public sentiment that behavior by Wall Street 
firms and executives are comparable to that of the Mob). 
11. See SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010). Here, the SEC sought the 
wiretaps used by the USAO in the parallel criminal proceeding for insider trading for its 
use in its civil enforcement proceeding. Id. at 164. 
12. See Fleming v. United States, 547 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1977) (allowing the IRS to 
introduce wiretap recordings obtained in a criminal investigation in a parallel civil 
enforcement proceeding); Kwan-Gett, supra note 1, at 97 (mentioning the SEC and the 
CFTC). It is also likely that other agencies could take advantage of wiretap recordings in 
their enforcement actions. 
13. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010) (civil case); United States v. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/5
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two cases have been somewhat mooted by the ruling in the Rajaratnam 
criminal case, where the wiretaps were found to be lawfully 
intercepted,
14
 Chiesi’s subsequent guilty plea,15 the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals’ ruling that the SEC does have an interest in discovering the 
wiretap recordings,
16
 and Rajaratnam’s ultimate conviction,17 the 
questions the cases initially raised are worth examining. Continued 
examination is especially necessary as these and other wiretap recordings 
are likely to be used in future criminal and civil cases.
18
 This analysis 
will help to more clearly illustrate how the contents of court-authorized 
wiretaps may be used in future civil enforcement proceedings by the 
SEC and other regulatory agencies with the power to bring civil 
enforcement actions.
19
 Nonetheless, it is important to note at the outset 
that the jurisdictional questions raised by this case are outside the scope 
of this article.
20
 
 
Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) 
(criminal case). 
14. United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (ruling that the wiretaps were lawfully intercepted). 
15. Patricia Hurtado et al., Danielle Chiesi Pleads Guilty to Insider Trading in 
Galleon Investigation, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 19, 2011, 5:55 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-19/danielle-chiesi-pleads-guilty-to-insider-
trading-in-galleon-group-probe.html [hereinafter Hurtado et al.] (describing the 
circumstances of Chiesi’s guilty plea). 
16. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 180-82 (2d Cir. 2010). 
17. Peter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Hedge Fund Billionaire is Guilty of Insider 
Trading, NY TIMES (May 11, 2011, 10:50 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/rajaratnam-found-guilty/ [hereinafter Hedge 
Fund Billionaire]. 
18. See Peter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Rajat Gupta Convicted of Insider Trading, 
NY TIMES (Jun. 15, 2012, 12:05 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/rajat-
gupta-convicted-of-insider-trading/ [hereinafter Rajat Gupta] (discussing the criminal 
case against Rajat Gupta, who was convicted of insider trading for tipping Rajaratnam, 
using wiretap recordings of conversations between the two of them). Gupta made similar 
arguments to Rajaratnam as he sought to suppress the wiretap communications at his 
trial. See United States v. Gupta, No. 11 Cr. 907(JSR), 2012 WL 1066817 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 27, 2012). 
19. While it is possible that some of these principles could be used by private civil 
litigants to obtain wiretaps, it is far less likely due to the privacy interests at stake. See 
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 735 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]urning 
Title III into a general civil discovery mechanism would simply ignore the privacy rights 
of those whose conversations are overheard.”); see also SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 
159, 176-79 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the balancing of right of access against privacy 
interests and indicating that the fact that the SEC is a government agency, not a private 
civil litigant, is important to the balancing). 
20. These jurisdictional issues include whether there is interlocutory jurisdiction for 
discovery rulings, whether mandamus review is appropriate, and what constitutes abuse 
3
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To have a proper understanding of the questions presented by the 
Rajaratnam cases, a basic understanding of the criminal and civil cases is 
necessary. Accordingly, Part II will briefly discuss the facts of the two 
cases, the investigation, and relevant court rulings. Part III will briefly 
discuss the history and relevant provisions of Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (“Title III”),21 the “comprehensive 
scheme” for regulating the authorization and disclosure of wiretaps.22 
Part IV will discuss the primary theories the SEC could have used to 
obtain wiretap recordings for use in its civil enforcement proceeding, 
namely disclosure from the U.S. Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) and from 
the civil defendant. This Part will also discuss timing as a factor for 
disclosure. Finally, in Part V, I will conclude with policy 
recommendations regarding how the issue can be more clearly resolved 
by congressional action and what the SEC can do to increase the 
likelihood of disclosure during discovery or otherwise. 
The use of wiretaps is currently being analyzed under two sets of 
rules, one within Title III and one outside Title III.
23
 Congress could 
simplify this area of the law, protect privacy, and strengthen civil 
enforcement efforts by reexamining and amending Title III. Specifically, 
Congress should address the concerns represented by the many balancing 
tests developed by the courts since enactment of Title III and more 
clearly allow regulatory agencies with civil enforcement power to 
receive wiretap recordings by deeming certain actors within these 
agencies investigative officers.
24
 These amendments could fully return 
the regulation of wiretaps and disclosure of wiretap recordings to the 
Title III framework, thus avoiding judicial balancing outside the statutory 
confines. If Congress does not address these issues, civil enforcement 
agencies should take steps on their own to simplify their path to 
obtaining wiretap materials, such as conditioning investigative aid on full 
disclosure. 
 
of discretion under these circumstances. See generally SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159 
(2d Cir. 2010). 
21. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510-2522 (2006) (while the statute is often referred to as the “Wiretap Act,” this 
Article will refer to the statute as “Title III”–the name commonly used in federal criminal 
practice). 
22. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972). 
23. See infra Part III (discussing Title III and the balancing framework that has 
developed outside of Title III). 
24. Under my proposal, regulatory agencies with civil enforcement power would 
not be given authority to petition courts to authorize wiretaps. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/5
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II. United States v. Rajaratnam and SEC v. Rajaratnam 
 
At the time, United States v. Rajaratnam,
25
 along with the related 
cases, was the largest hedge fund insider trading case ever brought 
criminally,
26
 and was arguably the largest insider trading case of any 
kind.
27
 When first announced, illicit profits were thought to be around 
$20 million;
28
 however, more recent estimates by the SEC have increased 
that number to more than $52 million.
29
 The insider-trading scheme was 
far-reaching and deep. In addition to hedge fund managers and 
employees like Raj Rajaratnam and Danielle Chiesi, the scheme included 
directors and executives of many well-known corporations including 
Intel Capital, IBM, McKinsey and Company, and Goldman Sachs.
30
 In 
total, approximately twenty-one people were charged, many of whom 
have already pleaded guilty or been convicted.
31
 The issues presented by 
these two parallel proceedings require a basic understanding of the facts 
of the insider-trading scheme, the USAO’s and SEC’s investigations, and 
preliminary court decisions, which will be discussed in Part II. 
 
A. Facts Surrounding the Galleon Insider-Trading Scheme 
 
The Galleon insider-trading scheme involved “widespread and 
repeated insider trading” at two major hedge funds: Galleon 
Management, managed by Raj Rajaratnam, and New Castle LLC, where 
Danielle Chiesi was a portfolio manager.
32
 The scheme was allegedly led 
by Rajaratnam and Chiesi and involved trading on material, non-public 
information of at least fourteen public companies,
33
 including companies 
 
25. No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). 
26. Bharara, supra note 6. 
27. Kwan-Gett, supra note 1, at 93. 
28. Bharara, supra note 6. 
29. Patricia Hurtado, SEC Seeks Wiretaps from Rajaratnam for Civil Case After 
Judge Admits Them, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 20, 2010, 3:02 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-20/sec-seeks-wiretaps-from-rajaratnam-for-
civil-case-after-judge-admits-them.html. 
30. Bharara, supra note 6; see also Rajat Gupta, supra note 18. 
31. Kwan-Gett, supra note 1, at 93; Hedge Fund Billionaire, supra note 17 (“Mr. 
Bharara noted that over the last 18 months, his office had charged 47 people with insider 
trading; Mr. Rajaratnam is the 35th to be convicted.”). 
32. Complaint at 2, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 1:09-CV-08811 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
16, 2009), 2009 WL 3329053 [hereinafter Galleon Complaint]. 
33. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 2, SEC v. Rajaratnam, 
Nos. 10-462-cv(L), 10-464-cv(Con) (2d Cir. May 24, 2010), 2010 WL 2584232 
5
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such as Google, Hilton Hotels Corporation, and Intel.
34
 The inside 
information originated from high-level executives and consultants at 
prominent companies
35
 and concerned “market moving events such as 
quarterly earnings announcements, takeovers, and material contracts.”36 
Rajaratnam received the tips from multiple tippers, who themselves 
anticipated getting reciprocal inside tips from Rajaratnam and Chiesi in 
the future, employment by Galleon Management, or substantial 
kickbacks.
37
 The USAO and the SEC alleged that Rajaratnam “exploited 
[this] corrupt network”38 of tippers and tippees since 2003 to realize 
significant monetary gains.
39
 The USAO unsealed criminal complaints 
charging Rajaratnam, Chiesi, and other defendants with securities fraud 
and conspiracy on October 16, 2009, the same day the SEC filed its civil 
complaint based on the same alleged activities.
40
 Ultimately, many of the 
defendants, including Danielle Chiesi, pleaded guilty to both civil and 
criminal charges.
41
 Rajaratnam was convicted of the criminal charges 
against him and, as part of the civil enforcement proceeding, ordered to 
pay a record $92.8 million in penalties.
42
 
 
 
 
 
[hereinafter SEC Brief]. 
34. Galleon Complaint, supra note 32, at 2. 
35. See id. 
36. SEC Brief, supra note 33, at 7. 
37. Galleon Complaint, supra note 32, at 10 (alleging a tipper provided Rajaratnam 
insider information with the hopes of being employed by Galleon and in anticipation of 
future inside tips); Associated Press, Gov’t Witness: Galleon Founder Paid for Tips, CBS 
MONEYWATCH (Mar. 14, 2011, 12:45 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/03/14/business/main20042916.shtml?tag=mncol;1
st;1 (alleging that one tipper, Anil Kumar, was promised payments of $500,000 per year 
as well as a $1 million kickback in exchange for inside information). 
38. Bob Van Voris, et al., Rajaratnam Exploited ‘Corrupt Network’ For Trades, 
Prosecutor Tells Jurors, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 10, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-09/rajaratnam-exploited-a-corrupt-network-
of-people-prosecutor-tells-jury.html. 
39. Associated Press, supra note 37. 
40. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2010). 
41. Hurtado et al., supra note 15; SEC Reaches Settlement with Insider Trading 
Convict Danielle Chiesi, CBS NEW YORK (July 14, 2011, 7:30 AM), 
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/07/14/sec-reaches-settlement-with-insider-trading-
convict/. 
42. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 822 F. Supp. 2d 432, 436 (S.D.N.Y 2011); Chad Bray, 
Rajaratnam Ordered to Pay Record SEC Penalty, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204554204577026372138523912.html. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/5
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B. USAO and SEC Investigations 
 
When Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York, announced that the USAO had unsealed criminal 
complaints against Rajaratnam, Chiesi, and four other defendants, he was 
flanked by Joe Demarest, the Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New 
York Division of the FBI, and Robert Khuzami, the Director of 
Enforcement for the SEC.
43
 Mr. Bharara called them “our two law 
enforcement partners in this case,”44 signaling how intertwined their 
investigative efforts had been.
45
 
The USAO’s investigation spanned over two years and included the 
use of informants, cooperating witnesses, consensual monitoring, and 
court-authorized wiretaps.
46
 Nonetheless, the USAO relied heavily on the 
SEC’s investigation, which used more traditional techniques to track the 
insider-trading scheme.
47
 In fact, before the wiretaps were made, the 
SEC’s investigation “was the bedrock of the prosecutor’s own criminal 
investigation,”48 as the USAO and the FBI had access to all the SEC’s 
files.
49
 The USAO’s investigation of Rajaratnam and Chiesi began in 
2007 and 2008, respectively.
50
 However, it did not seek to use wiretaps 
targeting either Rajaratnam or Chiesi until March 2008.
51
 Much of the 
evidence the USAO gathered before applying for wiretaps was gathered 
through the use of a confidential informant, Roomy Kahn, who had been 
cooperating with the FBI in the investigation of Rajaratnam, after she 
was investigated for insider trading violations of her own, including 
 
43. Bharara, supra note 6. 
44. See id. 
45. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at 
*15-23 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). 
46. Shifman, supra note 7. 
47. United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). This became an issue during the wiretap suppression hearing, 
since the USAO failed to include the extent of the SEC’s investigation, and their reliance, 
on the wiretap application. See generally id. 
48. Id. at *1. 
49. Id. at *15. 
50. Id. at *2. 
51. Id. The USAO also used wiretaps against defendants named in separate actions, 
even though they were involved in the same underlying insider-trading scheme. See Brief 
for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission at 6, SEC v. Rajaratnam, Nos. 10-462-cv(L), 10-464-cv(CON) 
(2d Cir. June 1, 2010), 2010 WL2584233. 
7
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providing tips to Rajaratnam.
52
 The wiretaps provided substantially more 
information over the sixteen-month period.
53
 They netted 18,150 
communications involving over 550 people.
54
 Those communications 
were intercepted from ten separate telephones, including home, office, 
and mobile lines.
55
 
On the other hand, the SEC’s investigation relied entirely on 
conventional investigative techniques.
56
 Though the SEC’s investigation 
was relatively successful, “[it] had . . . failed to fully uncover the scope 
of Rajaratnam’s alleged insider trading ring . . . .”57 The SEC had 
compiled a plethora of information through its investigation.
58
 The 
information consisted of millions of documents and witness interviews 
that SEC employees had gathered through the use of the SEC’s 
regulatory subpoena power.
59
 These documents included trading records, 
investor lists, emails, and Rajaratnam’s contact lists, hard drive, bank 
records, and calendar.
60
 The SEC even deposed Rajaratnam at least 
once.
61
 Furthermore, the SEC issued 221 subpoenas to various banks, 
clearing houses, telephone companies, and securities issuers.
62
 An 
analysis of these documents strongly implied that Rajaratnam was 
receiving or giving inside information by telephone.
63
 
The SEC and the USAO were “‘partners’ in the investigation.”64 
Besides having access to the SEC’s files, the USAO, the FBI, and the 
SEC had “numerous meetings” to “discuss the course of [the] 
investigation.”65 The SEC regularly “kept the criminal authorities up to 
speed” and provided particularly important documents and chronologies 
 
52. United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at *9-
12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). 
53. See SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2010). 
54. Id. Most of these communications are still non-public and have not been 
released to the SEC or used in non-redacted court documents. Id. at 166. 
55. Id. at 165. 
56. United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). 
57. Id. 
58. See id. at *15. 
59. See id. at *16. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683 F. Supp. 2d 316, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
65. United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at *15 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/5
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outlining trading patterns and conversations.
66
 “[T]he USAO and FBI 
either knew about or had access to ‘the best of what the SEC could 
produce.’”67 Despite the fact that the SEC, the USAO, and the FBI 
cooperated throughout the investigation,
68
 the SEC never received the 
wiretap recordings during the course of that investigative cooperation.
69
 
 
C. Court Decisions 
 
Because issues of timing can become relevant to the Title III 
analysis,
70
 a brief discussion of the civil and criminal cases against 
Rajaratnam and Chiesi is necessary. However, this section will not 
attempt to provide a detailed analysis of either case, but instead will 
focus on a general overview of the rulings in each case and the timing of 
the rulings in relation to each other. 
As previously stated, the SEC filed its civil complaint against 
Rajaratnam and Chiesi the same day the USAO unsealed its criminal 
complaints charging them with securities fraud and conspiracy.
71
 The 
SEC’s civil complaint was assigned to Judge Jed Rakoff and the criminal 
case to Judge Richard Holwell.
72
 Both the civil complaint and the 
criminal charges were based on the same allegedly illegal conduct.
73
 
Issues of timing often arise in white-collar cases, as they did here, 
because civil suits commonly get to court more quickly than the parallel 
criminal proceedings, though the criminal case will often be resolved 
more quickly than the civil case once it gets to court.
74
 Shortly after the 
criminal complaints were unsealed, and before indictment, the USAO 
disclosed wiretap communications to Rajaratnam and Chiesi according to 
 
66. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
67. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
68. Id. at *16. 
69. SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683 F. Supp. 2d 316, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The 
USAO did inadvertently disclose a small set of tapes to the SEC, though they were 
returned without being used. Id. at 319 n.2. 
70. For instance, wiretapped communications not related to an offense specified in 
the wiretap authorization cannot be disclosed pursuant to subsections (1), (2), or (3) 
without a ruling of legality by a judge of competent jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) 
(2006). 
71. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2010). 
72. Id. at 165. It is also important to note that another criminal case, based on the 
same allegations, was assigned to Judge Richard Sullivan. United States v. Goffer, 756 F. 
Supp. 2d 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
73. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2010). 
74. Kwan-Gett, supra note 1, at 5. 
9
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criminal discovery rules, and did so without a protective order.
75
 Because 
the USAO had not disclosed the contents of the wiretaps to the SEC 
during the investigation, the SEC sought production of the wiretaps 
through civil discovery.
76
 Rajaratnam and Chiesi, however, opposed the 
discovery request arguing that Title III precluded the disclosure of the 
contents to anyone but co-defendants.
77
 In his February 9, 2010 order, 
Judge Rakoff compelled discovery of the recordings subject to a 
protective order, stating that the recordings were “highly relevant” and 
that any privacy interest protected by Title III could be adequately 
protected through the protective order preventing further disclosure.
78
 
Judge Rakoff declined to rule on the legality of the wiretaps.
79
 He also 
appeared resolute about the fact that the civil case would move forward 
despite any delay in the criminal case.
80
 
Rajaratnam and Chiesi appealed Judge Rakoff’s order to the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which granted a stay in the discovery order 
pending appeal.
81
 The Second Circuit concluded that it had “no 
interlocutory jurisdiction to review the order,”82 but did find they had the 
power to review a “novel and significant question of law . . . whose 
resolution will aid in the administration of justice” through a writ of 
mandamus.
83
 More importantly, the Second Circuit held that the SEC did 
have a right to discover the wiretap recordings, but that Judge Rakoff 
would be unable to properly balance the public interest in discovery 
 
75. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2010); SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., 
LP, 683 F. Supp. 2d 316, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
76. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683 F. Supp. 2d at 317. 
77. Id. at 317-18. While the defendants claimed Title III prohibited them from 
disclosing the communications to the SEC, it is unclear why they believed it permitted 
disclosure to the co-defendants. Id. at 318 (“[Defendants] proved unable to cite any 
statutory authority for this restriction.”). 
78. Id. at 318-19. 
79. Id. at 319. 
80. See id. (explaining that “the trial of this action is firmly set for August 2, 
2010”); SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming that “because of 
the strong public interest in having cases of this kind move forward promptly” an 
adjournment would not be granted until after the criminal case was resolved). 
81. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010). At that point, Judge 
Rakoff concluded that resolution of wiretap issues was unlikely to occur before the civil 
trial, and granted an adjournment. Id. 
82. Id. at 168. 
83. Id. at 177. (quoting In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 939 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(internal citations omitted)). Whether the Second Circuit’s use of mandamus review is 
appropriate is certainly debatable, as it required the court to find that Judge Rakoff 
abused his discretion in ordering disclosure. Id. at 171. However, the jurisdictional issues 
are outside the scope of this paper. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/5
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against the relevant privacy interests before the legality of the wiretaps 
was determined by Judge Holwell.
84
 In so doing, the Second Circuit 
discussed Title III in depth and reaffirmed that “Title III does not 
prohibit all disclosures of legally intercepted wire communications that it 
does not expressly permit . . . .”85 Accordingly, the SEC would have to 
wait for the suppression hearings in the criminal case before they could 
renew their motion to discover the recordings.
86
 
Judge Holwell did not issue the suppression decision until 
November 24, 2010.
87
 In that order, he stated that the wiretaps of both 
Rajaratnam and Chiesi were legally obtained.
88
 More specifically, Judge 
Holwell decided that because Title III permitted wiretaps to investigate 
wire fraud,
89
 the government could use wiretaps to investigate insider-
trading schemes using telephones as long as the interceptions were 
“incidental.”90 In addressing legality, Judge Holwell had to determine 
whether there was probable cause to issue the wiretap order.
91
 This issue 
was complicated by the fact that the USAO had not given an accurate 
and complete description of their informant’s credibility and reliability, 
but ultimately Judge Holwell decided that there was sufficient evidence 
to establish probable cause with regard to both Rajaratnam and Chiesi.
92
 
Judge Holwell also had to address whether wiretaps were necessary or 
whether traditional methods of investigation would suffice.
93
 Again, the 
issue was complicated because the USAO failed to disclose the extent of 
the SEC’s investigation and their cooperation with the USAO’s 
investigation.
94
 Nonetheless, he decided that the government did meet its 
burden of necessity, since it need not exhaust every investigative 
technique
95
 and the facts were “minimally adequate” to justify the 
 
84. Id. at 180. 
85. Id. at 176. The circuit split on this part of the decision will be discussed in 
greater depth in Part III.B. 
86. See Field, supra note 3. 
87. United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). 
88. See generally id. See also Part III infra (discussing the Title III issues raised in 
Judge Holwell’s opinion). 
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(c) (2006). 
90. United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at *3-6 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). 
91. Id. at *6. 
92. Id. at *13. 
93. Id. at *14. 
94. Id. at *15-18. 
95. Id. at *14. 
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conclusion that traditional techniques would not be fully effective.
96
 
Finally, Judge Holwell had to determine whether the government 
properly minimized the interception of non-relevant recordings, which 
could lead to suppression if not properly done.
97
 Judge Holwell quickly 
found that the government was “objectively reasonabl[e] under the 
circumstances,” despite the fact that some non-relevant recordings were 
intercepted.
98
 Accordingly, he denied the motions to suppress, finding 
that the wiretaps were legally intercepted.
99
 
Chiesi and certain other defendants pleaded guilty to their criminal 
charges shortly after the suppression motion was dismissed.
100
 
Rajaratnam and Chiesi’s civil trial had been delayed, though Judge 
Rakoff had again ordered them to turn over relevant wiretap recordings 
to the SEC.
101
 Rajaratnam was subsequently convicted of all criminal 
charges against him.
102
 Ultimately, Rajaratnam agreed that the 
underlying criminal convictions estopped him from contesting civil 
liability for insider trading.
103
 As a result, the issues addressed during the 
civil enforcement proceeding were limited to the calculation of damages, 
thus rendering the discoverability and admissibility of wiretap recordings 
irrelevant.
104
 Chiesi settled her civil suit with the SEC for $540,000,
105
 
again mooting the wiretap issue in that case. Nevertheless, the question 
remains as to whether discovery and introduction of the wiretap 
recordings would be permissible if a civil defendant had not yet been 
criminally convicted or acquitted. 
 
 
 
 
 
96. Id. at *26. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at *28. 
99. Id. 
100. Judge: Rajaratnam Must Turn Over Wiretaps to SEC, FINALTERNATIVES (Feb. 
2, 2011 10:35 AM), http://www.finalternatives.com/node/15397. 
101. Id. 
102. United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2012 WL 362031, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y Jan. 31, 2012). 
103. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 822 F. Supp. 2d 432, 433 (S.D.N.Y 2011). 
104. See generally id. 
105. SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 09 Civ. 8811(JSR), 2011 WL 2695431 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 11, 2011); Danielle Chiesi, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3251, 2011 WL 
2956680 (July 22, 2011). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/5
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III. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
 
A. Background 
 
Title III
106
 is a “comprehensive statute” with which Congress 
attempted to regulate the “interception and disclosure of wire and oral 
communications.”107 It has a “dual purpose.”108 First, it seeks to protect 
the privacy rights of individuals and their Fourth Amendment rights.
109
 
Second, it seeks to provide “a uniform basis” for the authorization of the 
interception of wiretap communications.
110
 Title III was adopted 
following the Supreme Court decision Katz v. United States,
111
 which 
subjected electronic eavesdropping to Fourth Amendment protections.
112
 
The primary purpose of Title III was to “combat organized crime.”113 
Accordingly, it attempted to “preserve as much as could be preserved of 
the privacy of communications, consistent with the legitimate law 
enforcement needs that the statute also sought to effectuate.”114 It is 
important to note at the outset that Title III does not regulate the 
disclosure of information that is publicly available, because “one cannot 
‘disclose’ what is already in the public domain.”115 
 
B. Court Decisions 
 
The comprehensiveness of Title III is somewhat debatable in light 
of the many court decisions that introduced balancing tests to qualify its 
reach.
116
 Title III clearly forbids disclosure of wiretap evidence gained in 
 
106. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006). 
107. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 855 (3d Cir. 1978). 
108. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 1984). 
109. United States v. Masciarelli, 558 F.2d 1064, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977). 
110. Torres, 751 F.2d at 881 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1097, at 66 (1968)). 
111. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
112. Torres, 751 F.2d at 881. 
113. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 1097, at 70 (1968) (internal quotations omitted)). 
114. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 856 (3d Cir. 1978). 
115. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 546 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). 
116. See, e.g., Gardner v. Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1990); In re N.Y. 
Times Co. (New York Times I), 828 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Globe Newspaper 
Co., 729 F.2d 47, 56-58 (1st Cir. 1984). 
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violation of the Act.
117
 Some circuit court decisions have gone on to say 
that it “implies that what is not permitted is forbidden . . . .”118 However, 
other circuits have ruled that that view “is not a helpful guide to statutory 
interpretation”119 and does not apply to Title III.120 The Supreme Court 
has not yet ruled on this circuit split. But this debate on the maxims of 
statutory interpretation is paramount in determining what is permitted 
and prohibited by Title III and whether it truly is a comprehensive 
statutory framework governing wiretaps and wiretap recordings.
121
 
Also relevant to the debate of comprehensibility is the extent to 
which other interests have limited the goals of Title III. One such interest 
is the qualified right of access.
122
 This right of access is based on the 
First Amendment and the common law.
123
 Courts have held that this right 
of access must be balanced against privacy rights.
124
 This balancing test 
has been used in the context of court documents containing Title III 
evidence,
125
 as well as court proceedings where Title III evidence would 
be introduced.
126
 As a result, the public, often media entities, has been 
able to obtain Title III materials when Title III would otherwise appear to 
 
117. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (2006). 
 
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any 
person who-- . . . (c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, 
to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the 
information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or 
electronic communication in violation of this subsection . . . shall be 
punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as 
provided in subsection (5). 
 
Id. See also Fultz v. Gilliam, 942 F.2d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 1991). 
118. United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1232 (7th Cir. 1982); see Fultz, 942 
F.2d at 402. 
119. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 880 (7th Cir. 1984). 
120. See Gardner, 895 F.2d at 77. The Second Circuit continued to rely on its 
precedent in SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 176 (2d Cir. 2010). 
121. Courts have reached very different results depending on their decision as to 
what Title III implies. Compare Dorfman, 690 F.2d at 1230-35, with Gardner, 895 F.2d 
at 74-79. 
122. Gardner, 895 F.2d at 75; In re N.Y. Times Co. (New York Times I), 828 F.2d 
110, 113 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 56-58 (1st Cir. 1984). 
123. Gardner, 895 F.2d at 78. 
124. Id. at 74; United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 851 (3d Cir. 1978). 
125. See, e.g., Gardner, 895 F.2d at 75-76. 
126. See, e.g., In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d at 56-58. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/5
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prohibit disclosure of those materials.
127
 Since this balancing only takes 
account of the privacy interests addressed in Title III, not the prohibitions 
themselves, and balances them against other interests, it appears that the 
decision of whether disclosure is permissible lies outside the Title III 
framework.
128
 
The First Amendment was also implicated in Bartnicki v. Vopper,
129
 
where a party broadcasted illegal wiretap recordings over the radio.
130
 In 
Bartnicki, the Supreme Court held that in cases that “implicate[] the core 
purposes of the First Amendment . . . privacy concerns give way when 
balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public 
importance.”131 While the application of the balancing of the public 
interest against privacy interests does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that Title III wiretap evidence will always or frequently be 
disclosed to the public,
132
 it does raise the question of whether Congress 
actually “performed all of the balancing necessary of the public interest 
in law enforcement against the privacy interests of citizens.”133 It is 
apparent that the court system is still doing some balancing with Title III, 
including balancing it against Constitutional Amendments, as well as 
with common law rights. The question, then, is to what extent do other 
interests implicate the same balancing test of the public interest versus 
privacy rights? This balancing seems to fall outside of the Title III 
framework. 
 
C. Relevant Provisions of Title III 
 
Title III is a “complex”134 statute with “conflicting implications 
from different sections of [the Act].”135 Even so, an examination of only 
a few relevant provisions of Title III is essential to determine the various 
methods that would allow for the use of court-authorized wiretap 
recordings in civil enforcement proceedings such as the SEC’s case 
against Rajaratnam. 
 
127. See, e.g., Gardner, 895 F.2d at 79-80. 
128. See id. 
129. 532 U.S. 514, 517 (2001). 
130. Id. at 519. 
131. Id. at 533-34. 
132. See, e.g., In re New York Times Co. (New York Times II), 577 F.3d 401 (2d 
Cir. 2009). 
133. In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1078-79 (3d Cir. 1997). 
134. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 855 (3d Cir. 1978). 
135. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 71 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
15
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1. Section 2511—The General Prohibition 
 
Section 2511 of Title III provides a general prohibition against the 
intentional interception, or the attempted interception, of “wire, oral, or 
electronic communications,”136 as well as the “use of electronic, 
mechanical, or other communications.”137 Nonetheless, section 2511 
exempts certain acts from regulation under Title III, including recording 
of conversations where one party consents
138
 and the use of a pen 
register.
139
 Section 2518 also permits interception and disclosure by law 
enforcement according to a mandated statutory procedure.
140
 
In addition to prohibiting interception, section 2511 also prohibits 
intentional disclosure in a number of circumstances.
141
 First, subsection 
2511(1)(c) prohibits the intentional disclosure of the “contents of any 
wire, oral, or electronic communication” when the person “know[s] or 
[has] reason to know that the information was obtained . . . in violation 
of [subsection 2511(1)].”142 Rajaratnam pointed to this subsection 
claiming that it prohibited him from disclosing wiretaps to the SEC 
because he had reason to know the wiretaps were intercepted in violation 
of Title III, as evidenced by his motion to suppress.
143
 Second, similarly 
to subsection 2511(1)(c), subsection 2511(1)(d) prohibits the use of the 
contents of wire, oral, or electronic communications when the person 
“know[s] or [has] reason to know” they were obtained through a 
violation of subsection 2511(1).
144
 This subsection attempts to prevent 
acts such as blackmail, where disclosure may never actually occur.
145
 
Finally, subsection 2511(1)(e) prohibits disclosure of certain lawfully 
 
136. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006). 
137. § 2511(1)(b). Also note that this prohibition is qualified by five factors, at least 
one of which must be present. Id. These factors, however, are not important to this 
discussion. 
138. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). 
139. § 2511(2)(h)(i). Other acts by private individuals and law enforcement are also 
exempt under the Act, but they are not worth discussing for the purposes of this paper. 
See § 2511(2); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Litig., 216 F.3d 621, 624-25 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006). See infra Part III.C.4. 
141. § 2511(1)(c)-(e). 
142. § 2511(1)(c). 
143. Brief for Defendants-Appellants Raj Rajaratnam and Danielle Chiesi at 35-36, 
SEC v. Rajaratnam, Nos. 10-462-cv(L), 10-464-cv(CON), (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2010), 2010 
WL 2584235 [hereinafter Rajaratnam Brief]. 
144. § 2511(1)(d). 
145. See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Litig., 216 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2000). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/5
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intercepted communications when the person “know[s] or [has] reason to 
know that the information was obtained . . . in connection with a criminal 
investigation,” the person “received the information in connection with a 
criminal investigation,” and it is done “with intent to improperly 
obstruct, impede, or interfere with a duly authorized criminal 
investigation.”146 It is important to note that this subsection applies only 
to communications intercepted pursuant to certain subsections of section 
2511 and only when disclosed with the intent to “obstruct, impede, or 
interfere” with a criminal investigation.147 Accordingly, it is not 
generally applicable to all intercepted communications, primarily those 
that were exempted from the Act.
148
 Notably, a violation of Title III 
occurs at the time the interception is obtained, as well as with each 
subsequent disclosure to “a third party who has not yet heard [the 
recording].”149 Disclosure is permitted by section 2517 under certain 
circumstances.
150
 
 
2. Section 2515—Evidence 
 
Section 2515 prohibits the use of the contents of an intercept or 
“evidence derived therefrom . . . [as] evidence in any trial, hearing, or 
other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, 
agency, regulatory body, [or] legislative committee . . . if the disclosure 
of that information would be in violation of [Title III].”151 Nonetheless, 
many circuit courts have found that contents of communications obtained 
in violation of Title III may be used in order to impeach witnesses’ oral 
testimony or to impeach evidence submitted via sworn affidavit.
152
 
Important to the analysis of this section is what is considered 
evidence. Apparently, disclosure in violation of Title III would not 
prevent use of wiretap communications for purposes of impeachment, 
either in a civil or criminal case.
153
 Furthermore, it is important to note 
 
146. § 2511(1)(e). 
147. Id. 
148. See generally § 2511. 
149. Fultz v. Gilliam, 942 F.2d 396, 402 (6th Cir. 1991). 
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (2006); see infra Part III.C.3. 
151. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006). 
152. See, e.g., United States v. Baftiri, 263 F.3d 856, 856-57 (8th Cir. 2001); 
Culbertson v. Culbertson, 143 F.3d 825, 828 (4th Cir. 1998) (civil case); United States v. 
Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391, 1397 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 
477, 484 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 1973). 
153. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 152. 
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that use of the wiretaps or derivative evidence is only prohibited when 
disclosure is in violation of Title III.
154
 Based on the structure of this 
section, one could presume that Congress anticipated at least some 
situations where contents of wiretaps and derivative evidence could be 
used as evidence, including before regulatory bodies, agencies, and 
courts.
155
 In fact, courts have indicated that use in civil proceedings, such 
as in civil tax proceedings,
156
 may be appropriate. In dicta, the Second 
Circuit also insinuated that disclosure by the DOJ might be appropriate 
in civil RICO suits and “other situations where release would be 
compatible with the purposes of Title III.”157 Accordingly, Congress may 
not have intended the use of lawfully intercepted wiretap contents to be 
limited to criminal proceedings, especially when dealing with a civil 
enforcement proceeding predicated on the same acts charged 
criminally.
158
 
 
3. Section 2517—Permitted Disclosure 
 
Section 2517 describes situations under which lawfully intercepted 
wiretap contents may be disclosed.
159
 Only four are relevant in the 
context of use in civil enforcement proceedings.
160
 Subsection 2517(1) 
allows “any investigative or law enforcement officer” who legally 
obtained wiretap contents or derivative evidence to disclose them to 
another “investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that such 
disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties 
of the officer making or receiving the disclosure.”161 This authorization 
is more broad than subsection 2517(2), which authorizes only the use of 
legally obtained intercepts or derivative evidence by an “investigative or 
law enforcement officer” when the use “is appropriate to the proper 
 
154. § 2515. 
155. See id. 
156. Fleming v. United States, 547 F.2d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 1977). 
157. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 735 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1984). 
158. See SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 178-79 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the 
1970 amendment to Title III to permit disclosure in civil and criminal proceedings). 
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (2006). 
160. See § 2517(1), (2), (3), (5). The other provisions deal with various other 
instances allowing disclosure. § 2517(4) (retaining privilege); § 2517(6) (sharing 
information with foreign intelligence/counterintelligence) § 2517(7) (sharing information 
with foreign law enforcement officials); § 2517(8) (sharing information with any foreign 
or domestic official when the contents reveal a threat to the United States or foreign 
power). 
161. § 2517(1) (emphasis added). 
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performance of his official duties.”162 Nonetheless, both subsections 
2517(1) and 2517(2) are limited by the definition of “investigative or law 
enforcement officer,” which must be a person “empowered by law to 
conduct investigations of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in 
[section 2516], and any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or 
participate in the prosecution of such offenses.”163 Accordingly, under 
these subsections an investigative or law enforcement officer would only 
be permitted to turn over wiretap contents and derivative evidence to the 
extent doing so is “appropriate to the proper performance” of either that 
officer’s or the other officer’s duty,164 or to the extent disclosure was 
considered proper use according to that officer’s official duties.165 The 
application of these two subsections to civil enforcement proceedings, 
primarily SEC enforcement proceedings, will be discussed in Part IV. 
Subsection 2517(3) provides that “any person” who has lawfully 
received contents of intercepted communications or derivative evidence 
can “disclose the contents . . . while giving testimony under oath or 
affirmation in any proceeding held under the authority of the United 
States or of any State . . . .”166 Accordingly, it is possible that an 
investigative or law enforcement officer could disclose the contents of 
lawfully intercepted communications if called to testify in a civil 
enforcement proceeding.
167
 Furthermore, as Judge Rakoff noted, if the 
civil attorney could elicit the contents through testimony in court, “it 
would be absurd for the civil attorneys preparing the witness not to have 
access to the wiretap recordings beforehand.”168 This subsection will be 
discussed in greater detail in Part IV. 
Finally, subsection 2517(5) allows intercepted communications 
related to crimes not listed in the wiretap authorization or approval to be 
used according to subsection 2517(1) and 2517(2) without change, as 
 
162. § 2517(2) (emphasis added). 
163. § 2510(7). 
164. § 2517(1). 
165. § 2517(2). Presumably this is what was done when the USAO disclosed the 
wiretap recordings to Rajaratnam and Chiesi as part of criminal discovery. See SEC v. 
Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2010). 
166. § 2517(3). 
167. See, e.g., Fleming v. United States, 547 F.2d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating 
that FBI agents would have been able to disclose contents of wiretaps while testifying in 
a civil tax proceeding). 
168. SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683 F. Supp. 2d 316, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). But cf. 
In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Litig., 46 F. Supp. 2d 819, 831 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (stating 
that while the provision allows disclosure during testimony, it did not extend to pre-trial 
discovery). 
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well as subsection 2517(3) “when authorized or approved by a judge of 
competent jurisdiction.”169 This subsection would become relevant in 
instances where evidence of other crimes were “incidentally” 
intercepted, as would have been the case in the Rajaratnam case if 
insider trading had not been listed on the order.
170
 
 
4. Section 2518—Procedure for Interception 
 
Finally, section 2518 sets forth the procedure for which an 
“investigative or law enforcement officer” can apply “for an order 
authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic 
communication[s].”171 While a discussion of all the requirements and 
intricacies of the section is beyond the scope of this paper, a basic 
understanding of the requirements is useful for further analysis of 
whether the intercepts may be used in civil enforcement proceedings. 
Each application must be made under oath or affirmation
172
 and 
contain the identity of the officer making the application.
173
 Furthermore, 
it must contain a “complete statement of the facts and circumstances 
relied upon by the applicant” as to the offense, location of the proposed 
intercept, the “type of communications sought,” and, if available, the 
identity of the target.
174
 It must also give “a full and complete statement 
as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and 
failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or 
to be too dangerous.”175 This has been termed the necessity requirement, 
though complete exhaustion of alternatives is not required.
176
 Finally, 
there must be a set period of time for interception,
177
 a maximum of 
thirty days unless an extension is granted,
178
 and a recitation of the facts 
of any previous interception regarding the person or place targeted.
179
 
 
169. § 2517(5). 
170. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at 
*4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). 
171. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006). 
172. § 2518(1). 
173. § 2518(1)(a). 
174. § 2518(1)(b). 
175. § 2518(1)(c). 
176. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at 
*14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). 
177. § 2518(1)(d). 
178. § 2518(5). 
179. § 2518(1)(e). 
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Upon application, a judge may issue the order when “there is 
probable cause for [the] belief that an individual is committing, has 
committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in 
section 2516 . . . ,”180 there is probable cause that communications 
concerning the offense will be obtained through the interception,
181
 the 
judge finds that normal procedures have been tried or failed or are 
unlikely to succeed,
182
 and there is probable cause that the target location 
is being used in connection with the offense.
183
 The requirements for the 
application and order ensure that it is “‘sought in good faith and not as a 
subterfuge search . . .’” to gain evidence for a crime for which there is no 
probable cause.
184
 
Section 2518 goes further to impose a minimization requirement, to 
avoid interception of non-targeted communications,
185
 as well as a 
procedure for handling treatment of wiretaps and wiretap orders after 
recording.
186
 The details of these procedures need not be discussed in this 
paper. 
 
IV. Obtaining Wiretaps in Civil Enforcement Proceedings 
  
The parallel proceedings of SEC v. Rajaratnam
187
 and United States 
v. Rajaratnam
188
 raised the question of whether wiretaps, lawfully or 
unlawfully obtained in a criminal investigation, could be used in a 
parallel civil enforcement proceeding. These cases also presented the 
issue of timing, since the Second Circuit ruled that the judge in the civil 
case could not properly balance privacy interests against the need for 
disclosure until the suppression hearing challenging the wiretaps 
occurred.
189
 Presumably, the SEC could have attempted to obtain the 
wiretaps from two sources. First, it could have sought them from the 
USAO. Second, it could have sought them from the defendants, which it 
 
180. § 2518(3)(a). 
181. § 2518(3)(b). 
182. § 2518(3)(c). 
183. § 2518(3)(d). 
184. See United States v. Barnes, 47 F.3d 963, 965 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting United 
States v. Sedovic, 679 F.2d 1233, 1237 n.4 (8th Cir. 1982)). 
185. § 2518(5). 
186. § 2518(8)-(12). 
187. 622 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010). 
188. No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). 
189. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 185 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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did in this case, as part of civil discovery.
190
 Both of these methods will 
be analyzed in this section. The analysis will also take into account the 
issue of timing discussed above. 
 
A. From the USAO 
 
The SEC could have attempted to obtain the wiretap recordings 
from the USAO according to section 2517, either under subsection (1), 
(2), or (3).
191
 Each of these subsections present separate circumstances 
under which disclosure would be proper. Accordingly, each will be 
analyzed separately. 
Subsection 2517(1) authorizes the USAO to disclose the contents of 
the wiretaps obtained pursuant to Title III to an investigative or law 
enforcement officer if it is “appropriate to the proper performance” of 
either its or the receiving officer’s “official duties.”192 The United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York referred to the SEC as 
the USAO’s “law enforcement partner[].”193 If SEC attorneys are in fact 
investigative or law enforcement officers, this subsection would seem to 
allow disclosure, as the SEC is authorized to investigate violations of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
194
 However, because Title III’s 
definition of “[i]nvestigative or law enforcement officer” is limited to 
those who are “empowered by law” to investigate or make arrests for 
offenses enumerated in section 2516,
195
 the analysis becomes much more 
attenuated. Criminal wire fraud is an enumerated offense,
196
 however 
civil and criminal securities fraud are not.
197
 Nonetheless, the SEC is 
authorized to refer cases to the U.S. Attorney General for criminal 
prosecution.
198
 But this is unlikely to qualify the SEC as “empowered by 
law”199 to investigate wire fraud, even though practically, its employees 
will often investigate wire fraud as part of their insider trading 
 
190. See SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683 F. Supp. 2d 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
191. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1)-(3) (2006). 
192. § 2517(1). 
193. Bharara, supra note 6. 
194. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2006). 
195. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7) (2006). 
196. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(c) (2006). 
197. See § 2516. 
198. Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 
78u(d)(1). 
199. § 2510(7). 
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investigations
200
 and share that information with the U.S. Attorney 
General and USAO.
201
 Accordingly, it is unlikely that any circumstances 
exist in which any employee of the SEC could be considered an 
investigative or law enforcement officer under the Act and be permitted 
to receive wiretap recordings under this subsection. 
Subsection 2517(2) is broader in the sense that disclosure is not 
limited to an investigative or law enforcement officer.
202
 Instead, the 
USAO could disclose the wiretaps whenever it is “appropriate to the 
proper performance of [its] official duties.”203 Though the USAO initially 
took the position that it had authority to disclose the wiretaps to the SEC 
pursuant to this section,
204
 it later claimed that it could not disclose the 
recordings “to the SEC without any law enforcement purpose solely to 
assist the SEC in a civil case.”205 On its face, this statement is correct; the 
USAO may not disclose wiretap communications to the SEC unless 
appropriate to its duties.
206
 Nevertheless, if aiding civil enforcement 
branches like the SEC in their investigations was considered part of the 
USAO’s duties, disclosure would be appropriate. Instead, the USAO 
took the position that it could only disclose the recordings to the SEC 
pursuant to this section if disclosure was done to gain assistance from the 
SEC in its criminal investigation.
207
 Under that theory, disclosure would 
have been most appropriate when the SEC, FBI, and USAO were acting 
as partners in the investigation of Rajaratnam and Chiesi.
208
 
It appears that the USAO could take a more liberal approach to 
when disclosure is necessary to “obtain assistance in preventing, 
investigating, or prosecuting a crime . . .”209 and, thus, increase instances 
 
200. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). 
201. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1). 
202. § 2517(2). 
203. Id. 
204. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 165 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010). 
205. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission at *9 n.*, SEC v. Rajaratnam, Nos. 10-462-cv(L), 
10-464-cv(CON) (2d Cir. June 1, 2010) (first footnote). 
206. § 2517(2). 
207. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission at *9 n.*, SEC v. Rajaratnam, Nos. 10-462-cv(L), 
10-464-cv(CON) (2d Cir. June 1, 2010) (first footnote). 
208. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at 
*15-18 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (describing the investigation). 
209. Sharing Title III Electronic Surveillance Material with the Intelligence 
Community, 2000 WL 33716983 (O.L.C.), at *1 (Oct. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/titleIIIfinal.htm. 
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of disclosure and cooperation, though policy in the past has been to 
construe this power narrowly.
210
 However, it is uncontested that 
disclosure to the SEC could be appropriate in some circumstances. 
Accordingly, if the SEC were more adamant about receiving recordings 
in the initial phases of the investigation, one would assume the USAO 
would be more likely to comply and accept greater assistance from the 
SEC, especially since the SEC has discretion as to whether or not they 
will transmit evidence of criminal violations to criminal authorities and 
assist in USAO investigations.
211
 SEC policy conditioning assistance on 
full disclosure of relevant evidence would likely go a long way in 
encouraging more complete cooperation, as well as to strengthen the 
USAO’s argument that disclosure was necessary “to the proper 
performance of [its] official duties.”212 
Finally, the SEC could receive the wiretap recordings from the 
USAO (or the FBI) as testimony in the civil trial by calling a person with 
knowledge of the contents to the stand.
213
 Under this subsection “a judge 
of competent jurisdiction” may have to find that the wiretaps were 
lawfully intercepted,
214
 since securities fraud is not an enumerated 
offense.
215
 Nonetheless, it is possible that a ruling on legality is not 
required since securities fraud was listed on the wiretap application and 
order.
216
 The question then becomes whether the SEC would be able to 
discover the materials before the officer testifies, which is the subject of 
some controversy.
217
 While the literal reading of subsection 2517(3) 
seems to limit disclosure to testimony, it seems absurd
218
 to force the 
civil trial to “be carried on in the dark.”219 This seems to be one of those 
instances in which the court must balance privacy interests with the 
 
210. See id. 
211. See Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2006); Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2006). 
212. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2) (2006). 
213. § 2517(3). 
214. § 2517(5). 
215. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2006). 
216. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). 
217. Compare SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683 F. Supp. 2d 316, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010), with In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Litig., 46 F. Supp. 2d 819, 831 (C.D. Ill. 
1999). 
218. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Litig., 46 F. Supp. 2d at 831. 
219. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (discussing the purpose of the 
newly adopted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
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public interest of full discovery in civil enforcement proceedings.
220
 
Though not a common law or constitutional interest, the broad, liberal 
application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) is a well-
recognized aspect of modern civil litigation and is worthy of protection 
against narrow interpretation without specific prohibitions narrowing the 
Rules’ application.221 
All three of these subsections seem to assume that disclosure may 
be made without a determination as to the legality of the interception,
222
 
except as to disclosure through testimony about offenses not listed in the 
order.
223
 This makes sense since a judge has already made a preliminary 
determination that the interceptions are legal when he or she issued the 
wiretap order.
224
 Nevertheless, whenever the contents of the recordings 
are being introduced into evidence at the civil trial, the judge will be able 
to decide whether they are relevant and admissible.
225
 The judge may 
also have to make a determination of whether the interception was 
authorized pursuant to Title III to determine whether the contents or 
derivative evidence are admissible.
226
 Any “judge of competent 
jurisdiction” likely could make this determination, either in the criminal 
trial or in the civil trial.
227
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
220. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001) (balancing privacy 
interests with the public interest in publishing matters of public importance); Gardner v. 
Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1990) (balancing privacy interests with the right 
of access). 
221. See generally Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501-06 (“[S]ince the discovery provisions 
are to be applied as broadly and liberally as possible, the privilege limitation must be 
restricted to its narrowest bounds.”). 
222. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1)-(3) (2006). 
223. § 2517(5). 
224. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006). It is still possible that the wiretaps may be 
suppressed because of a failure to minimize or if the application was not “full and 
complete.” Id. It is unclear whether suppression is a result of the 4th Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule or because the intercepts were illegal and, thus, unable to be disclosed. 
See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 550-51; United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754-56 
(1979). 
225. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403 (relevancy and exclusion of relevant evidence). 
226. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006). 
227. See § 2517(5). 
25
ATKINS MACRO FINAL 7/26/2013 4:45 PM 
2013] WIRETAPS & CIVIL ENFORCEMENT 741 
B. From the Defendant 
 
As they did in SEC v. Rajaratnam, the SEC could seek to get the 
wiretap recordings from the defendant as part of civil discovery.
228
 
Obviously, this would require that the USAO have turned over the 
recordings to the defendants, as it did in SEC v. Rajaratnam, as part of 
criminal discovery.
229
 It may also require that they be disclosed to the 
defendants not subject to a protective order.
230
 Because Title III does not 
permit disclosure in this fashion, the court would have to accept “that 
Title III does not prohibit all disclosures of legally intercepted wire 
communications that it does not expressly permit.”231 If the court were to 
accept that interpretation, it would have to balance the privacy interests 
against the broad notion of liberally construed discovery rules,
232
 just as 
the courts have done with other constitutional and common law 
interests.
233
 This balancing, while acknowledging Title III interests, falls 
outside the regulatory bounds of the Act.
234
 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to allow both 
“parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts 
before trial.”235 They are to be “broadly and liberally” construed to allow 
for the discovery of “true facts . . . wherever they may be found.”236 The 
broad notion of civil discovery is only limited by privilege, which “must 
be restricted to its narrowest bounds.”237 Broad civil discovery is clearly 
expressed in Rule 26: “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . 
.”238 Furthermore, “the court may order discovery” of any relevant 
matter, which “need not be admissible” if it will likely lead to 
“admissible evidence.”239 
 
 
 
228. See generally SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010). 
229. Id. at 165. 
230. See SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683 F. Supp. 2d 316, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
231. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 176 (2d Cir. 2010). 
232. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1947). 
233. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 224. 
234. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
235. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501. 
236. Id. at 506. 
237. Id. 
238. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
239. Id. 
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The Second Circuit stated that the privacy interest must be balanced 
against the right of access.
240
 While that is certainly relevant, the court 
must also take account of the public interest in broad civil discovery 
rules—that “civil trials in the federal courts no longer need [to] be 
carried on in the dark.”241 The existence of Title III indicates the severity 
of the privacy interests at stake, even in lawfully obtained wiretap 
recordings.
242
 This privacy interest is not just invaded upon by the initial 
recording, but also upon each subsequent disclosure.
243
 Nonetheless, a 
party’s interest in discovering relevant evidence is also strong.244 As the 
Supreme Court has stated over and over, “[m]utual knowledge of all the 
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”245 
Here, however, mutual knowledge cannot be achieved without discovery 
of the wiretap materials.
246
 Rajaratnam was in possession of the wiretaps 
and could use them in preparation for both his criminal and civil trials.
247
 
This “informational advantage” could not be remedied in any way other 
than disclosure.
248
 
The informational gap between the two parties seems to hold true 
regardless of whether the intercepts were conducted lawfully or 
unlawfully. If they were intercepted in violation of Title III, however, the 
contents of the wiretap or any derivative evidence could not be 
introduced into evidence according to the plain language of Title III.
249
 
That may be an instance where Congress has truly done “all of the 
balancing necessary”;250 the informational imbalance is acceptable 
because of the privacy interests at stake. Nonetheless, disclosure through 
discovery may still be required since the SEC may be able to use the 
materials for purposes of impeachment.
251
 If a determination of legality 
is necessary, it seems that “any judge of competent jurisdiction” could 
 
240. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2010). 
241. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501. 
242. See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972) (asserting that “the 
protection of privacy was an overriding congressional concern”). 
243. See id. at 51-52. 
244. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). 
245. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507. 
246. See SEC Brief, supra note 33, at 3. 
247. See id. 
248. Id. at 42. 
249. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006). 
250. In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1078-79 (3d Cir. 1997). 
251. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 152. 
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make the determination,
252
 even though the judge in the criminal case or 
the authorizing judge may initially have more information to do so as a 
result of the judge’s prior involvement. 
While the privacy interests are strong, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure already contain a method to protect privacy interests—the 
protective order.
253
 The protective order allows a judge great leniency in 
deciding the method of discovery, as well as subsequent disclosure.
254
 A 
protective order should be sufficient to protect the privacy interests at 
stake, especially when dealing with legally intercepted 
communications.
255
 While the privacy interests are admittedly greater 
when dealing with illegally intercepted communications, a protective 
order may still be sufficient to allow discovery for purposes of 
impeachment. Furthermore, the judge should consider privacy interests 
of third parties when setting terms of discovery and disclosure.
256
 
Congress did not intend Title III to act as a “general civil discovery 
mechanism,” as it would “ignore the privacy rights of those whose 
conversations are overheard.”257 However, Title III would arguably not 
have this effect if allowed in civil enforcement proceedings. Intercept 
materials would not be “broadly available to all civil litigants . . . .”258 
Rather, it would be available to civil enforcement branches of 
government agencies “charged” with enforcing the civil law.259 It appears 
that the invasion of privacy interests is less severe in this context, 
especially when the USAO does not oppose disclosure.
260
 And again, 
even if discoverable, a judge may still rule that the wiretap contents are 
inadmissible at the civil proceeding or limit questioning because the 
contents are irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, or embarrassing.
261
 
 
 
 
 
252. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (2006). 
253. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
254. Id. 
255. See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Litig., 216 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2000). 
256. New York Times I, 828 F.2d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1987). 
257. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 735 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1984). 
258. Id. 
259. See SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683 F. Supp. 2d 316, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 
SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing the SEC as a 
“statutory guardian” rather than an “ordinary litigant”). 
260. See Gardner v. Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1990). 
261. FED. R. EVID. 401, 403, 611(a). 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/5
ATKINS MACRO FINAL 7/26/2013 4:45 PM 
744 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
Rajaratnam and Chiesi claimed that disclosure by them would be a 
violation of Title III.
262
 That was likely not an accurate statement of the 
law. First, it would be peculiar for a party to the recording to be held 
liable for disclosure, especially since the recording would be exempted 
from Title III if they had recorded it themselves or given consent.
263
 
Second, nothing in Title III actually forbids disclosure unless it was not 
intercepted according to Title III.
264
 Finally, even if it were a violation, 
reliance on a court order would be a complete defense against civil or 
criminal liability.
265
 Accordingly, after balancing privacy interests 
against the interest of broad civil discovery, disclosure was likely proper. 
While the legality of the wiretaps may play a role in that balancing 
analysis, there is no reason to assume that a particular judge must make 
the determination.
266
 This is especially true if there is a “strong public 
interest in cases of this kind moving forward promptly,” apart from the 
criminal trial, as Judge Rakoff suggests.
267
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
It appears that there is an “all-out assault on white collar crime” by 
the DOJ and that the use of wiretaps in white-collar criminal 
investigations will only increase.
268
 Attempts to use wiretap recordings in 
parallel civil enforcement proceedings are also likely to increase, 
especially now that the Second Circuit seems likely to permit discovery 
 
262. Rajaratnam Brief, supra note 143, at 35. 
263. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c), (d) (2006). Accordingly, intentional disclosure or 
intentional use may act as “constructive” consent. 
264. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2517 (2006). 
265. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d) (2006). 
266. This is especially true when multiple criminal cases are ongoing, as was the 
case here. The civil case need not wait for a determination by the trial court, which may 
never come if the case were to settle before a suppression hearing occurs. See Plaintiff’s 
Memorandum of Law in Support of its Renewed Motion to Compel Production of 
Relevant, Legally Obtained Wiretapped Communications, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 
No. 09 Civ. 8811(JSR) 2010 WL5191710, at *3 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2010) (discussing 
additional wiretaps that had not undergone a suppression hearing). 
267. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Judge Rakoff) 
(explaining why the district court reserved judgment on the suppression motion). 
268. Hillary Russ, DOJ Promises More Wiretaps in White Collar Cases, LAW360 
(Nov. 4, 2010, 3:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/206673/doj-promises-
more-wiretaps-in-white-collar-cases; see also Peter J. Henning, The Winning Record of 
Prosecutors on Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2012, 11:49 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/the-winning-record-of-prosecutors-of-insider-
trading/. 
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after suppression hearings occur.
269
 Accordingly, civil enforcement 
branches like the SEC can take actions that make it easier for them to 
obtain wiretap recordings. One such method would be to condition aid in 
USAO criminal investigations on forthright cooperation by the USAO, 
including disclosure of wiretap recordings. This gives the USAO a better 
argument that disclosure is proper under Title III
270
 and would avoid the 
unnecessary controversy over when wiretap contents can be disclosed 
through testimony
271
 and ordinary civil discovery. 
At least some circuit court decisions are allowing disclosure outside 
Title III’s confines, such as through civil discovery.272 The balancing test 
employed allows for discovery when the privacy interest is not too 
severe as to outweigh the necessity for disclosure.
273
 The Second Circuit 
held that this test can only occur after the legality of the wiretaps is 
tested.
274
 Nonetheless, it is likely that the test could be employed if the 
civil judge made a ruling on the legality of the wiretaps, rather than 
waiting on a determination by the judge in the criminal trial. This is 
especially necessary when dealing with multiple criminal cases. 
However, the problem could be avoided altogether if the judge were to 
stay the civil trial until after the criminal trial, when legality has been 
tested and some wiretap contents have already become public. This 
would seem to be a wise approach if disclosure was not obtained through 
Title III mechanisms. 
Title III is no longer a “comprehensive scheme” to regulate 
wiretaps.
275
 The courts have broken it down through the use of various 
balancing tests.
276
 Congress should consider incorporating these 
balancing tests into Title III by addressing these interests. Congress 
could also amend Title III to allow civil enforcement attorneys to receive 
wiretap contents as investigative officers.
277
 This would avoid the current 
 
269. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Jonathan Stempel, 
Analysis - Galleon Wiretaps Big for White Collar Crime Cases, REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2010, 
9:12 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/01/27/idINIndia-45739920100127. 
270. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2) (2006). 
271. See § 2517(3), (5). 
272. See, e.g., SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010). 
273. Id. at 183. 
274. Id. at 187. 
275. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972). 
276. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Gardner v. Newsday, Inc., 
895 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1990); New York Times I, 828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Globe 
Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1984). 
277. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1) (2006). This proposal would only cause civil 
enforcement attorneys to act as investigative officers for purposes of disclosure, not for 
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problems presented by the balancing tests because of timing with 
criminal cases.
278
 As it stands, the courts are currently operating under 
two sets of rules, one within the bounds of Title III and the other a 
balancing of interests outside the Title III statutory framework. Congress 
could do much to simplify this area of the law, protect privacy, and 
ensure strong civil enforcement by bringing both these sets of rules back 
under the umbrella of Title III. 
 
purposes of making wiretap applications. 
278. A balancing test would still likely need to be employed before offering the 
contents as evidence in the civil trial. 
31
